A friend of a homeowners insured brought his truck to the latter's home, where the two set about replacing the brake shoes on the truck. The truck was backed partially into the garage, which was attached to the home. The two were having difficulty removing lug nuts when another friend of the insured, who had a welding torch in his vehicle, stopped by for a visit. Learning of the problem with the lug nuts, he agreed to use his welding torch to remove them.

Upon inquiry, the torch bearer was told that their were no inflammable materials in the garage, and applied the torch. Sparks ignited a pan of flammable liquid under the truck, the insured tried to carry it out of the garage, and dropped it with resulting injury to the welder from flammable liquid splashing onto him. The injured man sued the insured, alleging negligence in the insured's failure to warn of the danger after inquiry, the picking up of the burning pan, dropping it and kicking it. The insurer denied insurance coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action to affirm its contention that the claim was not covered by virtue of the familiar automobile exclusion.

The trial court determined that their were two causes of the injury. One was the use of the torch on the truck, which was within the scope of the automobile exclusion. The other was negligence for failure to warn of the flammable liquid and the kicking of the pan, a nonvehicle related risk. The court concluded that coverage was applicable.

The appeal court reversed on the ground that use of the cutting torch was maintenance of the vehicle and the efficient cause of the injuries to the welder. It said that the injuries would not have occurred if sparks from the cutting torch had not precipitated the chain of events, regardless of the alleged negligence and actions of the insured. Further appeal followed.

The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the trial court had used the concurrent cause doctrine in finding an obligation on the part of the insurer to provide coverage. It found that the appeal court had reversed on the basis of the chain of events doctrine. It said: "We reject the contention that there can be no coverage when the chain of events leading to the ultimate harm is begun by an excluded risk. . . ." The court said that, unquestionably, the use of the torch per se would constitute an excludable risk. It said, however, that other causal factors could not be ignored. The basis of the lawsuit was the alleged negligence of the insured in failing to warn of the dangerous substance and his dropping and kicking the pan of burning liquid.

The judgment of the appeal court was reversed and that of the trial court was reinstated in favor of the insured and against the insurer.

(ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, Appellee v. WATTS ET AL., Defendants, Appellants. Tennessee Supreme Court, at Jackson. Filed June 10, 1991. CCH 1991-92 Fire and Casualty Cases, Paragraph 3234.)